This Article studies the way women’s autonomy is limited in two contexts: contract and abortion. In cases of both freedom of contract and reproductive freedom, the courts employ a narrow, individualistic notion of autonomy, balanced against other policy considerations. Since both the notion of autonomy and the way it is balanced against competing interests are gendered, women’s autonomy is restricted. To better protect women’s autonomy, this Article suggests applying a relational and more complex notion of autonomy. Relational autonomy would consider the social relations that constitute women’s autonomy—including oppression—and propose ways to restructure these relations to enhance autonomy. Contrary to a freedom-public policy binary, relational autonomy provides a more comprehensive notion of autonomy, enabling consideration of the many conflicting values while not pitting one against the other.
Orit Gan, On Women’s Autonomy: From Muller to Dobbs, 29 J. Gender, Race & Just. 111 (2026).